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See post, at 79, 23. This Courts opinion in McDaniel v. Barresi, 402 U. S. 39 (1971), fits comfortably within this framework. Swann, supra, at 6; see also Green v. School Bd. In Brown V. Board of Education, the court ruled that 'separate but equal' was an unconstitutional provision and that the practice of segregation was 'inherently unequal'. "It is not often in the law that so few have so quickly changed so much," Justice Breyer said of the Court's decision. It wrote that there was overwhelming evidence of the Boards good faith compliance with the desegregation Decree and its underlying purposes. It added that the Louisville School Board had treated the ideal of an integrated system as much more than a legal obligationthey consider it a positive, desirable policy and an essential element of any well-rounded public school education.. Id., at 470. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (U.S. 2007). 05908, 426 F.3d 1162; No. The Equal Protection Clause, ratified following the Civil War, has always distinguished in practice between state action that excludes and thereby subordinates racial minorities and state action that seeks to bring together people of all races. The new policy added an explicitly racial criterion: If a place exists in a school, then, irrespective of other transfer criteria, a white student may transfer to a predominantly black school, and a black student may transfer to a predominantly white school. 662. It then created a mixed student body by assigning to those schools students who would otherwise attend predominantly white, or predominantly black, schools elsewhere. The decision was a 5-4 split on the Court, with both sides claiming that their position was truest to the precedent set in Brown v. School Dist. The dissents characterization of Swann as recognizing that the Equal Protection Clause permits local school boards to use race-conscious criteria to achieve positive race-related goals isat besta dubious inference. As we have held, one form of injury under the Equal Protection Clause is being forced to compete in a race-based system that may prejudice the plaintiff, Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Peńa, 515 U. S. 200, 211 (1995); Northeastern Fla. Chapter, Associated Gen. [Footnote 1] The plan allows incoming ninth graders to choose from among any of the districts high schools, ranking however many schools they wish in order of preference. The Courts of Appeals below upheld the plans. In doing so, a reviewing judge must be fully aware of the potential dangers and pitfalls that Justice Thomas and Justice Kennedy mention. I agree with The Chief Justice that we have jurisdiction to decide the cases before us and join Parts I and II of the Courts opinion. 5 (Jan. 2003), online at http://www.civilrightsproject.harvard.edu/research/reseg03/AreWeLosingtheDream.pdf (Frankenberg, Lee, & Orfield) (using U. S. Dept. Yet the plurality would deprive them of at least one tool that some districts now consider vitalthe limited use of broad race-conscious student population ranges. Adarand, 515 U. S., at 227; Grutter, 539 U. S., at 326; Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005) (We have insisted on strict scrutiny in every context, even for so-called benign racial classifications). Another brief claims that school desegregation has a modest positive impact on the achievement of African-American students. App. 1 is premised upon the constitutionality of the original Seattle Plan, it is equally premised upon the constitutionality of the present plan, for the present plan is the Seattle Plan, modified only insofar as it places even less emphasis on race-conscious elements than its predecessors. 05915, at 410. in Briggs v. Elliott, O.T. 1953, No. For the 2005-2006 school year, seven out of ten of the high schools had racial balances that varied more than 15 percent from the racial balance of the school district as a whole. The District further points to the line of Supreme Court cases requiring that schools desegregate even when such segregation was simply the effect of where the districts boundaries were drawn. An Ohio statute provides, in respect to student choice, that each school district must establish [p]rocedures to ensure that an appropriate racial balance is maintained in the district schools. Ohio Rev. 1725, 2841. It is not simply one factor weighed with others in reaching a decision, as in Grutter; it is the factor. But I can find no case in which this Court has followed Justice Thomas colorblind approach. Race-conscious objectives to achieve diverse school environment may be acceptable. If an educational interest that combines these three elements is not compelling, what is? The first case started in 1998 when five African American high school students sued JCPS to allow them to attend Central High School, a magnet school. We take the Grutter Court at its word. by it. One can attempt to identify a construction of Jefferson Countys student assignment plan that, at least as a logical matter, complies with these competing propositions; but this does not remedy the underlying problem. This Court has made many decisions of widespread effect; none would affect more people more directly in more fundamental interests and, in fact, cause more chaos in local government than a reversal of the decision in this case). Any use of race to distinguish one person from another threatens to stigmatize individuals and incite hostility. friend of JOSHUA RYAN McDONALD, PETITIONER. See, e.g., post, at 21, 4849, 66. Furthermore, it was only used in a limited number of schoolsthose that were both over subscribed and relatively unintegrated. And it was Brown, after all, focusing upon primary and secondary schools, not Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U. S. 629 (1950), focusing on law schools, or McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents for Higher Ed., 339 U. S. 637 (1950), focusing on graduate schools, that affected so deeply not only Americans but the world. There is ample precedent in the decisions of this Court to uphold school segregation); Brief for Petitioners in Gebhart v. Belton, O.T. 1952, No. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth and in power. The Constitution is color-blind. 05908, at 308a. 1", "Guidance ESE from Assistant Secretary for Civil Rights Russlynn Ali and United States Assistant Attorney General Thomas E. Perez", "McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools & Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. of Oral Arg. 2d 854 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part [*2761] and concurring in judgment), "Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 2d 1224 (2001); 426 F.3d 1162 (CA9 2005) (en banc) (Parents Involved VII). See Grutter, 539 U. S., at 342 (stating the requirement that all governmental use of race must have a logical end point). 7231. Accepting Justice Breyers approach would do no more than move us from separate but equal to unequal but benign. Metro Broadcasting, supra, at 638 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). This case was originally filed in 2001 in the Western District of Washington, which ruled in favor of the school district. 1" (2007) and "Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education" (2007), the high court forbade those . Both Brown V. Board of Education and parents involved in Community Schools v. Seattle presented their case on grounds of 'Equal Protection' laws of the 14th Amendment. Argued December 4, 2006Decided June 28, 2007. It contends that race was used in a narrow way because the race tiebreaker determined the placement of only about ten percent of incoming high school students and was one of several factors under consideration. The system that was upheld in Grutter considered a number of other factors to assure diversity of not only race but also socioeconomic status, skills, and so forth. Racial imbalance is the failure of a school districts individual schools to match or approximate the demographic makeup of the student population at large. Brief for Respondents in No. School boards may pursue the goal of bringing together students of diverse backgrounds and races through other means, including strategic site selection of new schools; drawing attendance zones with general recognition of the demographics of neighborhoods; allocating resources for special programs; recruiting students and faculty in a targeted fashion; and tracking enrollments, performance, and other statistics by race. The principle that racial balancing is not permitted is one of substance, not semantics. The wide variety of different integration plans that school districts use throughout the Nation suggests that the problem of racial segregation in schools, including de facto segregation, is difficult to solve. The new plan permitted each student to choose the school he or she wished to attend, subject to race-based constraints. The government bears the burden of justifying its use of individual racial classifications. 1, 458 U. S., at 472473. In fact, without being exhaustive, I have counted 51 federal statutes that use racial classifications. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT No. But to this the replication must be: Even so, measures other than differential treatment based on racial typing of individuals first must be exhausted. of Ed., 72 F.Supp. . Code Ann. at 17. [Footnote 1]. In 1999, several parents brought a lawsuit in federal court attacking the plans use of racial guidelines at one of the districts magnet schools. No. See ante, at 1112, 3132, n.16, 3435 (citing Adarand, supra, at 227; Johnson v. California, 543 U. S. 499, 505 (2005); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U. S. 306, 326 (2003)). (Enrollment Guide). 05908, at19. 2005) (" Parents IV"). b. explicitly overturned the Supreme Court's decision in Brown v. As part of that burden it must establish, in detail, how decisions based on an individual students race are made in a challenged governmental program. I have no quarrel with the proposition that the Fourteenth Amendment sought to bring former slaves into American society as full members. See Brief for Petitioner at 21. siso/reports/anrep/altern/938.pdf. It then placed some grades (say, third and fourth grades) at one school building and other grades (say, fifth and sixth grades) at the other school building. Where that is so, the judge would carefully examine the programs details to determine whether the use of race-conscious criteria is proportionate to the important ends it serves. 1, 458 U. S. 457, is directly on point. See App. As becomes clearer when the districts plan is further considered, Jefferson County has explained how and when it employs these classifications only in terms so broad and imprecise that they cannot withstand strict scrutiny. The cases here were argued upon the assumption, and come to us on the premise, that the discrimination in question did not result from de jure actions. It is an interest in continuing to combat the remnants of segregation caused in whole or in part by these school-related policies, which have often affected not only schools, but also housing patterns, employment practices, economic conditions, and social attitudes. Therefore, it is not nearly as apparent as the dissent suggests that increased interracial exposure automatically leads to improved racial attitudes or race relations. 2d 304. 539 U. S., at 324325 (internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the programs are subject to the general rule that government race-based decisionmaking is unconstitutional. The Current Plan, 1999 to the Present. Data for the Seattle schools in the several years since this litigation was commenced further demonstrate the minimal role that the racial tiebreaker in fact played. This Court then held that the initiativewhich would have prevented the Seattle Plan from taking effectviolated the Fourteenth Amendment. . in No. Today, however, the Court restricts (and some Members would eliminate) that leeway. The tenth high school, West Seattle, is located west of downtown. It is difficult to believe that the Court that held unconstitutional a referendum that would have interfered with the implementation of this plan thought that the integration plan it sought to preserve was itself an unconstitutional plan. The District Court also adopted a complex desegregation plan designed to achieve the orders targets. Sch. It is clear to us that focusing simply on demographic issues detracts from focusing on improving schools). Public School Dist., p.2 (Aug. 6, 1996) (1996 Memorandum). See Grutter 539 U.S. at 330. The State Supreme Court wrote: Despite the initiatives undertaken by the defendants to alleviate the severe racial and ethnic disparities among school districts, and despite the fact that the defendants did not intend to create or maintain these disparities, the disparities that continue to burden the education of the plaintiffs infringe upon their fundamental state constitutional right to a substantially equal educational opportunity. Id., at 42, 678 A. Simply because the school districts may seek a worthy goal does not mean they are free to discriminate on the basis of race to achieve it, or that their racial classifications should be subject to less exacting scrutiny. The degree of heterogeneity within these districts is immediately apparent. 05908, p.227a; Reply Brief in No. The board estimated that its new plan would lead to annual reassignment (with busing) of about 8,500 black students and about 8,000 white students. Gen. Acts 552 (2007). Moreover, the school districts did not consider other options that might have been more narrowly tailored. at 958. Indeed, if our history has taught us anything, it has taught us to beware of elites bearing racial theories. Rather, it must explain to the courts and to the Nation why it would abandon guidance set forth many years before, guidance that countless others have built upon over time, and which the law has continuously embodied. Ibid. No one here disputes that Louisvilles segregation was de jure. The board responded to the lawsuit by introducing a plan that required race-based transfers and mandatory busing. See, e.g., Brief for Respondents in No. It sought one law, one Nation, one people, not simply as a matter of legal principle but in terms of how we actually live. First, the race-conscious criteria at issue only help set the outer bounds of broad ranges. Wash., 2001). This Court has carved out a narrow exception to that general rule for cases in which a school district has a history of maintaining two sets of schools in a single school system deliberately operated to carry out a governmental policy to separate pupils in schools solely on the basis of race.[Footnote 4] See Swann, 402 U. S., at 56. of Ed. However, the dissenters argued that the Constitution permits such desegregation even though it does not require it. This article examines the Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle Public School District No.1 decision in light of its impact on the Brown ruling that preceded it. Third, a more important response is the pluralitys claim that later casesin particular Johnson, Adarand, and Gruttersupplanted Swann. Unless we believe that the Constitution enforces one legal standard for the South and another for the North, this Court should grant Seattle the permission it granted Clarke County, Georgia. How does one tell when a racial classification is invidious? Any other approach would freeze the status quo that is the very target of all desegregation processes.). And they are not uniquely relevant to schools or uniquely teachable in a formal educational setting. Id., at 347. 1", Learn how and when to remove this template message, Guidance on the Voluntary Use of Race to Achieve Diversity and Avoid Racial Isolation in Elementary and Secondary Schools, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, McFarland v. Jefferson County Public Schools, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, Green v. County School Board of New Kent County, "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS V. SEATTLE: THE END OF RACE BASED SCHOOL POPULATIONS", "Schools Are More Segregated Today Than During the Late 1960s", "PARENTS INVOLVED IN COMMUNITY SCHOOLS v.SEATTLE SCHOOL DIST. As to drawing neighborhood attendance zones on a racial basis, Louisville tried it, and it worked only when forced busing was also part of the plan. See supra, at 1214. Seattle and Louisville are two such districts, and the histories of their present plans set forth typical school integration stories. 2, 2001). 3, p. 76 (As time passes, it may well be that segregation will end), with post, at 19 ([T]hey use race-conscious criteria in limited and gradually diminishing ways); post, at 48 ([E]ach plans use of race-conscious elements is diminished compared to the use of race in preceding integration plans); post, at 55 (describing the historically-diminishing use of race in the school districts). Purportedly benign race-based decisionmaking suffers the same constitutional infirmity as invidious race-based decisionmaking. Applying a test from Grutter, the Circuit Court also ruled that the tiebreaker plan was narrowly tailored, because 1) the District did not employ quotas, 2) the District had considered race-neutral alternatives, 3) the plan caused no undue harm to races, and 4) the plan had an ending point. Certainly if the constitutionality of the stark use of race in these cases were as established as the dissent would have it, there would have been no need for the extensive analysis undertaken in Grutter. That, too, strongly supports the lawfulness of their methods. Unlike the dissenters, I am unwilling to delegate my constitutional responsibilities to local school boards and allow them to experiment with race-based decisionmaking on the assumption that their intentions will forever remain as good as Justice Breyers. Id. Eighty-four students were assigned to schools that they did not list as a choice, but 29 of those students would have been assigned to their respective school without the racial tiebreaker, and 3 were able to attend one of the oversubscribed schools due to waitlist and capacity adjustments. . These arguments are inimical to the Constitution and to this Courts precedents. No. Consequently, in 1996, the board modified Project Renaissance, thereby creating the present plan. These effects not only reinforce the prior gains of integrated primary and secondary education; they also foresee a time when there is less need to use race-conscious criteria. The school districts have not carried their heavy burden of showing that the interest they seek to achieve justifies the extreme means they have chosendiscriminating among individual students based on race by relying upon racial classifications in making school assignments. The plurality, by contrast, does not acknowledge that the school districts have identified a compelling interest here. of New York v. Harris, 444 U. S. 130, 148149 (1979), the Court concluded that a federal statute required school districts receiving certain federal funds to remedy faculty segregation, even though in this Courts view the racial disparities in the affected schools were purely de facto and would not have been actionable under the Equal Protection Clause. In both cities, the school boards adopted plans designed to achieve integration by bringing about more racially diverse schools. See Seattle School District, Ethnic Count 2005-2006, at 8. Jefferson County accordingly does not rely upon an interest in remedying the effects of past intentional discrimination in defending its present use of race in assigning students. See also Brief for Appellees in Davis v. County School Board, O.T. 1952, No. Ultimately, the dissents entire analysis is corrupted by the considerations that lead it initially to question whether strict scrutiny should apply at all. Absent searching judicial inquiry into the justification for such race-based measures, there is simply no way of determining what classifications are benign or remedial and what classifications are in fact motivated by illegitimate notions of racial inferiority or simple racial politics. Richmond v. J. ORAL ARGUMENT OF HARRY J.F. PICS goes on to argue that because racial balance is not a compelling state interest, the plan is therefore automatically unconstitutional. No. Some studies have even found that a deterioration in racial attitudes seems to result from racial mixing in schools. Nothing but an interest in classroom aesthetics and a hypersensitivity to elite sensibilities justifies the school districts racial balancing programs.